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Testimony of the Governor of the Banco de España, Miguel Fernández Ordóñez,
to the Parliamentary Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs
The performance of the Spanish economy referred to in the annual report of the Banco de 
España forming the subject-matter of this appearance before Parliament is, as you know, set 
against a background of fi nancial and economic crisis which is worldwide and without prece-
dent for many decades.
The origin of the crisis – which dates back to the summer of 2007 – was eminently fi nancial 
and its propagation was hastened by the globalisation of fi nancial activity. The activity of the 
international fi nancial markets suffered severely, practically coming to a standstill in some of 
them. The fi nancial tension reached its peak in October 2008 and, although it has ebbed in 
recent months, still remains at relatively high levels.
The seriousness of the fi nancial shocks prompted a deep real crisis which affected the world 
economy with unheard-of intensity and simultaneity, pushing most developed countries into 
recession at the end of 2008. From 2008 Q4 contractions were seen in the activity of many 
countries and in world trade, which worsened in the fi rst quarter of this year. However, activity 
may have already bottomed in that period, since the most recent indicators suggest that, al-
though production will probably continue to decline, it will do so more moderately, which 
seems to indicate that the risk of a recessionary spiral in the world economy is more remote.
The dimensions of this crisis and the multiplicity of its ramifi cations mean that a response on 
various fronts is required to prevent it from recurring. It is evident that the fi nancial crisis has 
revealed numerous shortcomings in fi nancial regulation, which must be dealt with promptly. 
Moreover, it is necessary to analyse why the structural weaknesses of economies and of fi nan-
cial systems were not detected or corrected in time, thereby permitting a contagion of consid-
erable size to be triggered. With the benefi t of hindsight, it seems clear that the economic 
policies of past years were generally too permissive of the imbalances generated by the grow-
ing indebtedness during the high-growth stage.
It is therefore essential for the authorities to examine critically the institutional and regulatory 
frameworks of their economies and fi nancial systems and design mechanisms to reinforce 
them, so that mechanisms can be set in place to prevent a crisis like this one from being re-
peated.
That review should encompass various basic areas. I will leave for later those concerned with 
fi nancial regulation and supervision policies and will now focus on the need for examining the 
role of macroeconomic policies. This examination should assess the part played by them in the 
gestation of the crisis and analyse how their design can be optimised to make it more suitable 
for correcting imbalances such as those seen in recent years. In the fi scal policy sphere, the 
lack of a more powerful stabilising role in the high-growth years was noted with regret, since it 
would have balanced the momentum of private spending and helped to keep public fi nances 
on a more sustainable path in the medium and long term. In regard to monetary policy, more 
attention must be paid to the role of central banks in stability strategies.
Many of the measures adopted by economic and monetary authorities in recent months were 
based on common principles agreed jointly in the framework of different international fora. In 
the case of the European Central bank, unprecedented expansionary measures were set in 
train to alleviate the contractionary trends apparent both in the real economy and in the fi nan-
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cial sector. The provision of liquidity was made more fl exible from the very summer of 2007, 
although it was from October 2008 when the changes became more substantial, since institu-
tions’ requests for liquidity began to be met in full and the range of fi nancial assets eligible as 
collateral for those operations was widened. Since summer 2008, the policy interest rate has 
fallen by 325 basis points to stand, following the meeting last May, at a historical low of 1%. In 
the fi eld of exceptional measures, mention should be made, among others, of the lengthening 
of the periods for which liquidity is provided, which now extend up to 12 months, and the re-
cent decision to admit the outright acquisition of mortgage covered bonds.
Governments have also adopted numerous measures to combat the fi nancial crisis. They fall 
into two broad groups: those intended to support the fi nancial systems and those designed to 
boost spending. The fi rst group includes a wide variety of instruments ranging from the exten-
sion of bank deposit guarantees, through the granting of State guarantees for bank securities 
issues, to the injection of government capital in some institutions and the purchase of problem 
assets forming part of bank portfolios. Of the measures to stimulate demand, mention should 
be made of the operation of automatic fi scal stabilisers, which are very important in the Euro-
pean economies, and of the specifi c government spending or tax cutting measures to support 
the groups or sectors hardest hit by the crisis.
The measures by the Spanish authorities generally follow these same lines. Thus in Spain they 
are as follows: deposit guarantees were extended, a Fund for the Acquisition of Financial As-
sets was set up to purchase high-quality assets from Spanish institutions; guarantees are 
being granted for the issuance of bank bonds; the opening of diverse lines of special fi nancing 
through the ICO was approved; new personal income tax credits were introduced; and the 
so-called State Fund for Local Investment and the Special State Fund to Invigorate the Econ-
omy came into operation. More recently, new measures to spur demand (such as car pur-
chase assistance) have been announced, and the fi nishing touches are being put to a Bank 
Restructuring and Organisation Fund, which will serve as a tool for revamping the Spanish fi -
nancial system.
Let me now focus my attention on the situation of the Spanish economy. The international 
crisis came at a particularly delicate time for Spain, since the economy was already undergo-
ing the adjustment of certain imbalances which had accumulated during the long stage of high 
growth from the mid-1990s. The imbalances in Spain had some points in common with those 
detected at global level, but also some specifi c features.
As in other countries, the buoyancy of private sector spending in Spain was based on a rapid 
increase in household and corporate debt, spurred by low initial levels of debt and by favour-
able fi nancial conditions arising from a monetary policy stance which during that period was 
too lax for the conditions of the Spanish economy. The fi nancial laxity also led to an excessive 
concentration of economic and fi nancial resources in the real estate sector, and this subse-
quently added to the severity of the adjustment phase. For its part, fi scal policy undertook a 
signifi cant process of consolidation, but its contribution to the moderation of domestic de-
mand was not suffi cient to offset the effects of the monetary laxity.
As you are well aware, the Spanish economy underwent a very severe adjustment in the second 
half of 2008: GDP showed negative quarter-on-quarter growth rates from Q3 onwards, increas-
ingly so until 2009 Q1, in which activity decreased by 1.9% with respect to the previous quarter, 
this coming on top of the fall-off of 1% in the fourth quarter of last year. This contraction led to a 
year-on-year fall of 3% in GDP in 2009 Q1. The economic data for Q2 are not yet conclusive, but 
in any event suggest that activity is not contracting as quickly as in the previous quarter.
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In the Spanish recession, the strong impact of the international fi nancial crisis was superim-
posed on the real estate adjustment, which had begun to have an effect some time before. 
The size of the resulting shock was substantial and it deeply affected the confi dence of agents 
and depressed spending decisions and employment behaviour.
A notable development in 2008 was the sharp decrease in household spending, which hit both 
consumption and residential investment. But the worsening of the fi nancial crisis from summer 
onwards and the deterioration of the macroeconomic outlook meant that other items were 
also affected, for instance corporate investment. This sharp fall in domestic demand brought 
a substantial decrease in imports and, as a result, the contribution of net external demand to 
GDP improved, dampening the fall-off in activity.
The contraction of private spending meant that some of the imbalances accumulated in previ-
ous years began to be adjusted. Net lending by households increased, with a notable rise in 
the rate of saving, and net borrowing by fi rms decreased. All this was refl ected in a fall in the 
nation’s net borrowing, the rate of which has gradually quickened over the last few quarters.
The weakness in activity gradually spread to all productive sectors, with decreases in employ-
ment, initially in construction but subsequently in industry and, fi nally, services. There was thus 
widespread job destruction, which became extremely intense in late 2008 and early 2009, and 
a very substantial increase in the unemployment rate to 17.4% in 2009 Q1.
While the recession in Spain in terms of GDP growth is less serious than in other European 
countries, the sharp increase in the unemployment rate is a characteristic feature of Spain 
which is particularly harmful and reveals a basic weakness of its institutional structure which 
must be corrected.
One of the problems of the workings of the labour market relates to the insensitivity of labour 
costs to the particular conditions of each fi rm or to changes in the business cycle. Specifi cally, 
in 2008 labour costs increased markedly, a development which refl ected the deteriorating in-
fl ation owing to the sharp oil price rises in the fi rst half of the year. Although pressure from 
wage costs seems to have begun to ease in 2009, their rate of change is insuffi cient with re-
spect to the path of infl ation and to the recession currently besetting the economy, and, ac-
cordingly, the resulting real wage growth will not be conducive to job creation.
In recent months it has become apparent that the current recession, which is sharply affecting 
household consumption, is also causing downward revision of prices and margins. Thus in 
May the year-on-year rate of change of the CPI was -0.9%, the lowest level since the mid-
1900s, 0.9 pp below the euro area infl ation rate. Although by the end of the year these year-
on-year rates will foreseeably turn positive again once the statistical effect linked to the oil price 
rises in the early months of 2008 peters out, it was nonetheless notable that May saw year-on-
year decreases in food and industrial goods prices. Also, in services, which is traditionally the 
most infl ationary component of the Spanish economy, a gradual moderation is taking place. 
This price behaviour is in the appropriate vein for improving the competitiveness of the econ-
omy, reducing the costs of the recession and initiating a solid recovery.
The outlook for the Spanish economy is that GDP may continue contracting for the rest of the 
year. The resulting fall for 2009 as a whole will be very substantial, although probably less than 
in other European countries, more affected by the slump in world trade in recent months. Al-
though GDP may continue to fall in 2010 in annual average terms, it will do so at a less pro-
nounced rate, since the wide range of measures taken should gradually moderate the inten-
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sity of the shocks constraining activity. However, given the extent of the adjustments bearing 
on employment, the unemployment rate may yet remain on an upward path.
It is true that some imbalances accumulated during the expansion are being corrected. As just 
mentioned, the infl ation differential with respect to the euro area is now favourable to Spain, 
while the external defi cit is falling sharply in a trend which will foreseeably continue, such that, 
as a ratio of GDP, in 2010 it will fall to less than half its value in 2007. Although Spain should 
insist on reabsorbing these imbalances, it is undeniable that the improvements obtained are 
linked to an abrupt contraction in demand, with highly negative effects on the unemployment 
rate and the productive system. It is thus essential to change certain aspects of Spain’s insti-
tutional framework to prevent these losses of jobs and productive capacity from becoming 
entrenched and hindering recovery and to ensure that the imbalances of recent years do not 
reappear when demand starts to grow again.
In the recovery of the Spanish economy, as in the case of the world economy, a major contri-
bution will be made by the special measures adopted in demand-side (monetary and fi scal) 
policies and in fi nancial system support. However, in Spain, where domestic demand is very 
much affected by the need to strengthen the fi nancial position of the private sector and by the 
impact of the high unemployment rate, reliance will have to be placed on the recovery of ex-
ternal demand as the principal driver of spending. To capitalise on the improvement in external 
demand when it comes, fi rms will have to be able to offer competitive products, and to do this 
they will have to increase their productivity and adjust their costs, margins and prices fl exibly.
The substantial cuts in offi cial rates of central banks throughout the world in the past year have 
prompted a signifi cant drop in the cost of fi nancing. In Spain the resulting expansionary stimu-
lus is particularly powerful because of the predominance of variable-rate fi nancing. This boost 
will be particularly notable in certain sectors, such as residential construction, in which the 
combination of lower interest rates and price adjustments will make houses more affordable 
for households.
As in other countries, fi scal policy in Spain also contributed to cushioning the decrease in ac-
tivity, through both the action of automatic stabilisers and the adoption of diverse discretionary 
measures. This fi scal effort, of considerable size, generally exceeds that of other EU countries. 
Moreover, in Spain, the loss of revenue due to weaker spending came on top of the drying-up 
of the wind-fall revenues made possible by the housing boom of the past decade. All this 
meant that the general government balance worsened considerably, swinging from a surplus 
of more than 2% of GDP in 2007 to a defi cit which, according to the latest fi gures announced 
by the government, may stand at nearly 10% of GDP in the current year.
These developments have exhausted the possibilities of expansionary fi scal policy action. The 
fi scal imbalance has reached a level at which a corrective strategy is required, and this strat-
egy must be credible so that agents trust that budgetary stability will be maintained in the 
medium run. In this respect, the government has just announced the budgetary stability tar-
gets for the period 2010-2012 committing it to an enormous effort in fi scal consolidation. It 
aims to cut the defi cit from the nearly 10% of GDP that may be reached in 2009 to 3% in 2012, 
thereby complying with the guidelines set for Spain by the European Council in respect of 
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. The size of the envisaged correction in such a 
short space of time calls for a strict budget outturn and the adoption of energetic measures. 
The recent increase in some indirect taxes is an initial step in this direction, although past ex-
perience shows that for fi scal consolidation processes to be successful, they must focus on 
cutting government spending, particularly that which is unproductive. In this respect, the re-
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gional governments, given their share of government spending, will have to contribute actively 
to getting the country back onto the path of fi scal consolidation and budgetary stability.
In any event, although monetary and fi scal policies have played an extremely important role in 
offsetting the huge contractionary forces bearing on economies, this policy support cannot 
continue to be relied on once the recovery commences. Governments and central banks have 
to design “exit strategies” for terminating the current extraordinary fi scal and monetary policy 
action, so as to prevent future processes of economic instability from taking root. For this 
purpose, the policy effort will have to concentrate on reforms aimed at improving the produc-
tivity and performance of the factor and product markets. Unlike in the fi eld of demand-side 
policies, here the room for action is ample and, in addition, its potential effects are signifi cant.
As noted above, one of the main problems of the Spanish economy lies in the labour market. 
The current crisis has caused the unemployment rate to surge once again, reminding us that 
adjustment in the Spanish economy basically takes place through job destruction. Action is 
needed to prevent the higher numbers of unemployed from becoming a permanent phenom-
enon and their level of employability from deteriorating rapidly. Action is also needed to enable 
the rapid reallocation of resources across sectors, so that the slack in real estate activity can 
be smoothly taken up by other productive sectors.
The labour reform is unavoidable and must address different areas. In the fi eld of collective 
bargaining, it seems that labour and remuneration conditions have to adjust more fl exibly to 
the economic situation, particularly that currently being faced by fi rms or specifi c productive 
sectors. It is also vital to make changes to the recruitment systems and to improve the labour 
market intermediation systems and the mobility and training of the unemployed, so that work-
ers who have lost their jobs can fi nd new opportunities promptly. These reforms would not only 
improve the medium-term growth outlook of the Spanish economy, but would also help to 
prevent deterioration of the productive system.
Obviously, although the labour market is important, it is not the only area calling for reform by 
the Spanish authorities. Closely linked to the labour market is the issue of human capital and 
education, where it bears repeating that, although the returns are primarily in the medium term, 
the need for reform is urgent. Finally, in Spain it is essential to establish a much more solid 
competitive environment, in which fi rms can operate more effi ciently and on an equal footing 
with those of other countries. Services play a key role in this environment since they account 
for a growing share of industrial activities. Furthermore, the lack of liberalisation of some seg-
ments may be limiting their expansion. This is particularly pernicious because the services 
sector encompasses some of the most dynamic activities with the greatest capacity to gener-
ate employment. In this respect, the government’s recently proposed initiative to implement 
the Services Directive through a draft law involving action in numerous areas must be applied 
resolutely, and, for this purpose, regional and local government will have to cooperate in their 
areas of competence. Also, fomenting competition in the network industries would enable in-
puts to be supplied to other productive activities under more competitive conditions.
To conclude, let me briefl y review the situation of the Spanish banking system.
The distinguishing feature of the situation in Spain is that this crisis found Spanish credit institu-
tions in a relatively strong position. Their business model was the traditional one, focused on 
the retail segment and evolving separately from those more sophisticated models which have 
seriously damaged the institutions – and even the entire fi nancial systems – of other countries. 
This explains why the weight of toxic assets in the balance sheets of Spanish institutions is 
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insignifi cant. Also, the Banco de España helped to strengthen the starting position of Spanish 
institutions vis-à-vis the crisis, since it required anticyclical provisions to be set up to lessen the 
pressure in tougher times and it defi ned suffi ciently wide scopes of consolidation for banking 
groups to enable accurate valuation of the risks assumed.
These strong starting conditions enabled the Spanish fi nancial system to withstand the fi rst 
wave of the fi nancial crisis and to continue channelling the necessary infl ow of foreign saving, 
although by different routes, since the paralysis of the securitised asset markets meant that 
alternative sources, such as short-term paper issuance and ECB loans, had to be tapped. 
Deposits gained in relative weight during the fi rst phase of the tensions.
However, the transformation of the fi nancial crisis in recession gave rise to a second wave of 
risks for fi nancial stability, this time of an eminently macroeconomic nature. Although the Span-
ish fi nancial system faces this second wave with the relative advantage of having been less 
damaged by the fi rst, the deterioration of the Spanish economy unquestionably puts pressure 
on bank income statements in a number of ways.
Specifi cally, job destruction is impairing some households’ ability to pay, while the decline in 
activity is being particularly noticed in the real estate sector, which required abundant fi nancing 
and had acquired a high relative weight in the balance sheets of some institutions. Hence, after 
a long period of economic expansion in which doubtful assets ratios fell to historical lows, 
since 2008 they have been rising signifi cantly and foreseeably the pressure has not yet run its 
course. In addition, lending activity has slowed substantially as a result of both demand-side 
and supply-side factors, and lending can be expected to grow more slowly than GDP in the 
coming months, as has occurred in other similar cycles.
These two factors – slower banking business growth and rising bad debts – put pressure 
on Spanish banks’ income statements in 2008. However, the traditional banking model, 
much less dependent on fi nancial market performance, along with the still-favourable rates 
at which spreads were holding, allowed earnings to remain positive despite the diffi cult 
economic situation.
However, this pressure on Spanish institutions’ income can be expected to continue in the future 
due to the foreseeable increase in bad debts and, in the more medium term, to the downward 
pressure that the competition for funding will put on operating margins, against a background of 
deleverage of the fi nancial sector and, in general, of the economy, which is taking place both in 
Spain and globally and which cannot be considered a temporary phenomenon.
I am convinced that the Spanish fi nancial system can overcome these challenges, although, 
as I have repeated on various occasions, banks will not be immune to the crisis and not all of 
them start from the same position when it comes to confronting this diffi cult stage, since they 
followed different credit policies in the past and managed their risks in different ways. In any 
event, banks necessarily have to adapt to the new circumstances, and so have to rationalise 
their operating cost structures and correct the excess capacity of the sector.
The fi nancial system plays a central role in any economy, since it is fundamental in the alloca-
tion of fi nancial resources. This role explains why the State, like other governments, has shown 
its readiness to provide capital to the viable credit institutions that need it. These contributions 
of capital must not, of course, be unconditional, but rather subject to the restructuring of the 
institutions that receive those public funds, so as to seek both the lowest cost for taxpayers 
and maximum effi ciency of the system. It should be noted that, moreover, this approach is 
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fully in line with the common principles agreed in international fora and expressly backed by 
this Parliament with a broad consensus. I trust that these principles and this spirit of coopera-
tion in matters of general interest related to the stability and strength of the Spanish fi nancial 
system can soon be manifested in a set of legal provisions which will strengthen the capacity 
to take action as and when problems arise, in line with the tradition of the Banco de España 
and in accordance with the specifi city of the serious tensions now being faced.
